

The Anatomy of a Secure Java Web App Using Apache Fortress

October 11, 2018

AppSec USA, San Jose

Objective

Think about how we should be securing web apps.

(if we removed all stops)

Intro

- John Tumminaro
 - VP Technology, GlobalLogic
- Shawn McKinney
 - Software Architect, Symas

Agenda

1. Have a look at Equifax
2. End-to-End Security w/ Apache Fortress Samples
3. Talk about RBAC and ABAC

Recommendation

Listen and absorb *conceptually*. Slides are published and have the *details*.

<https://iamfortress.files.wordpress.com/2018/09/anatomy-secure-web-app-appsec-2018-v41.pdf>

What's The Problem

- Equifax Breach
 - 143 million Americans' personal info, including names, addresses, dates of birth and SSNs compromised.
 - Only a veneer of security in place.

Summary

Possible Remote Code Execution when performing file upload based on Jakarta Multipart parser.

Who should read this	All Struts 2 developers and users
Impact of vulnerability	Possible RCE when performing file upload based on Jakarta Multipart parser
Maximum security rating	Critical
Recommendation	Upgrade to Struts 2.3.32 or Struts 2.5.10.1
Affected Software	Struts 2.3.5 - Struts 2.3.31, Struts 2.5 - Struts 2.5.10
Reporter	Nike Zheng <nike dot zheng at dbappsecurity dot com dot cn>
CVE Identifier	CVE-2017-5638



The Exploit

“The Jakarta Multipart parser in Apache Struts 2 2.3.x before 2.3.32 and 2.5.x before 2.5.10.1 mishandles file upload, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a #cmd= string in a crafted Content-Type HTTP header, as exploited in the wild in March 2017.”

<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5638>



CVE-2017-5638: Apache Struts 2 Vulnerability Leads to Remote Code Execution

Posted on: March 9, 2017 at 5:51 am **Posted in:** Exploits, Vulnerabilities

Author: Suraj Sahu (Vulnerability Research Engineer)



The Exploit

Apache Struts is a free and open-source framework used to build Java web applications. We looked into past several Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities reported in Apache Struts, and observed that in most of them, attackers have used Object Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) expressions. The use of OGNL makes it easy to execute arbitrary code remotely because Apache Struts uses it for most of its processes.

Using OGNL, a **researcher** found a new remote code execution vulnerability in Apache Struts 2, designated as CVE-2017-5638. An exploit has been **reported** to be already in the wild; our own research and monitoring have also seen attacks using the vulnerability.



<https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cve-2017-5638-apache-struts-vulnerability-remote-code-execution/>



OGNL, again

Apache Struts RCE payloads often come in the form of Object-Graph Navigation Library (OGNL) expressions. OGNL is a language for interacting with the properties and functions of Java classes and Apache Struts supports it in many contexts.

For example, the snippet below uses OGNL to dynamically insert the value "5" into a webpage by calling a function.

```
<s:property value="%{getSum(2,3)}" />
```

OGNL expressions can also be used for more general code execution:

```
{  
  #_memberAccess["allowStaticMethodAccess"]=true,  
  @java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('calc')  
}
```

<https://blog.cloudflare.com/apache-struts-s2-057/>



Behind The Equifax Breach

The image shows a promotional graphic for a Black Duck webinar. On the left, there is a stylized network diagram with blue nodes and connecting lines. The Black Duck logo, consisting of the word "BLACK" in white and "DUCK" in blue, is in the top right corner. The main title "Behind the Equifax Breach: A Deep Dive Into Apache Struts CVE-2017-5638" is centered in white text. Below the title, the names of the speakers are listed: Patrick Carey, Chris Fearon, and Pat Durante.

BLACKDUCK

**Behind the Equifax Breach:
A Deep Dive Into Apache
Struts CVE-2017-5638**

Patrick Carey, Vice President of Product Marketing
Chris Fearon, Director of Security Research
Pat Durante, Sr. Director of Education Services



Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach

UPDATE: MEDIA ALERT: The Apache Software Foundation Confirms Equifax Data Breach Due to Failure to Install Patches Provided for Apache® Struts™ Exploit

2. Establish a process to quickly roll out a security fix release of your software product once supporting frameworks or libraries needs to be updated for security reasons. Best is to think in terms of hours or a few days, not weeks or months. Most breaches we become aware of are caused by failure to update software components that are known to be vulnerable for months or even years.

Once followed, these recommendations help to prevent breaches such as unfortunately experienced by Equifax.

For the Apache Struts Project Management Committee,

René Gielen

Vice President, Apache Struts

<https://blogs.apache.org/foundation/entry/apache-struts-statement-on-equifax>

The Solution

Ensure all appropriate patches have been applied.

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Dependency_Check

OWASP Dependency-Check

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Dependency_Check

OWASP Dependency-Check

Dependency-Check is a utility that identifies project dependencies and checks if there are any known, publicly disclosed, vulnerabilities. Currently, Java and .NET are supported; additional experimental support has been added for Ruby, Node.js, Python, and limited support for C/C++ build systems (autoconf and cmake). The tool can be part of a solution to the OWASP Top 10 2017 A9:2017-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities [1] previously known as OWASP Top 10 2013 A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities.

Quick Download

Version 3.3.2

- [Command Line](#)
- [Ant Task](#)
- [Maven Plugin](#)
- [Gradle Plugin](#)
- [Jenkins Plugin](#)
- [Mac Homebrew](#)



OWASP Vulnerability Scanning (Java)

Add to your Maven pom.xml file:

```
<plugin>  
  <groupId>org.owasp</groupId>  
  <artifactId>dependency-check-maven</artifactId>  
  <version>3.3.1</version>  
  <configuration>  
    <failBuildOnAnyVulnerability>true</failBuildOnAnyVulnerability>  
  
    <suppressionFile>${project.basedir}.../suppression.xml</suppressionFile>  
  </configuration>  
</plugin>
```

Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach

UPDATE: MEDIA ALERT: The Apache Software Foundation Confirms Equifax Data Breach Due to Failure to Install Patches Provided for Apache® Struts™ Exploit

3. Any complex software contains flaws. Don't build your security policy on the assumption that supporting software products are flawless, especially in terms of security vulnerabilities.

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How do we make our software
free of *unknown* vulnerabilities?

The Solution (Take 2)

Practice the principle of least privilege.
(Employ mandatory access controls)

Employ a Runtime Java Security Policy

```
grant codeBase "file:${catalina.home}/webapps/my-web-app-1/-" {  
    permission java.net.SocketPermission "localhost", "resolve";  
    permission java.net.SocketPermission "127.0.0.1:32768", "connect,resolve";  
    permission java.lang.reflect.ReflectPermission "suppressAccessChecks";  
    permission java.io.SerializablePermission "enableSubclassImplementation";  
    permission java.io.FilePermission ".../resources/", "execute";  
    ...  
};
```

^ use w/ caution



Example #1

<https://github.com/shawnmckinney/remote-code-execution-sample>

remote-code-execution-sample

Example shows how to use the Java Security Manager to prevent remote code execution exploits.

Intro to the Problem

- The Problem: Equifax Breach, 143 million Americans' personal info, including names, addresses, dates of birth and SSNs compromised.
- Only a veneer of security was in place.

The Exploit

- The vulnerability *Apache Struts*, *CVE-2017-5638*.
- <http://www.zdnet.com/article/equifax-confirms-apache-struts-flaw-it-failed-to-patch-was-to-blame-for-data-breach/>

CVE-2017-5638: Apache Struts 2 Vulnerability Leads to Remote Code Execution

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APPSEC USA
San Jose, CA

Not a Perfect Solution


```
grant codeBase "file:${catalina.home}/webapps/my-web-app-1/-" {  
    permission java.net.SocketPermission "localhost", "resolve";  
    permission java.io.FilePermission ".../resources/good-scripts*", "execute";  
    permission java.net.SocketPermission "127.0.0.1:32768", "connect,resolve";  
    permission java.lang.reflect.ReflectPermission "suppressAccessChecks";  
    permission java.io.SerializablePermission "enableSubclassImplementation";  
    permission java.lang.reflect.ReflectPermission "suppressAccessChecks";  
};
```

Permission Target Name	What the Permission Allows	Risks of Allowing this Permission
suppressAccessChecks	ability to access fields and invoke methods in a class. Note that this includes not only public, but protected and private fields and methods as well.	This is dangerous in that information (possibly confidential) and methods normally unavailable would be accessible to malicious code.



What now?

ARCHITECTURE



<https://www.monkeyuser.com/2018/architecture/>



Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach

UPDATE: MEDIA ALERT: The Apache Software Foundation Confirms Equifax Data Breach Due to Failure to Install Patches Provided for Apache® Struts™ Exploit

The Apache Struts Project Management Committee (PMC) would like to comment on the Equifax security breach, its relation to the Apache Struts Web Framework and associated media coverage.

4. Establish security layers. It is good software engineering practice to have individually secured layers behind a public-facing presentation layer such as the Apache Struts framework. A breach into the presentation layer should never empower access to significant or even all back-end information resources.

Once followed, these recommendations help to prevent breaches such as unfortunately experienced by Equifax.

For the Apache Struts Project Management Committee,


René Gielen <https://blogs.apache.org/foundation/entry/apache-struts-statement-on-equifax>

Vice President, Apache Struts

Main article: [Defense in depth \(computing\)](#)


Information security must protect information throughout the life span of the information, from the initial creation of the information on through to the final disposal of the information. The information must be protected while in motion and while at rest. During its lifetime, information may pass through many different information processing systems and through many different parts of information processing systems. There are many different ways the information and information systems can be threatened. To fully protect the information during its lifetime, each component of the information processing system must have its own protection mechanisms.

The building up, layering on and overlapping of security measures is called **defense in depth**. In contrast to a metal chain, which is famously only as strong as its weakest link, the defense-in-depth aims at a structure where, should one defensive measure fail, other measures will continue to provide protection.



Java Web Security Layers

1. Java SE Security
2. Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE)
3. Java EE Security
4. Spring Security
5. Web App Framework
6. Database Framework




Each with a specific purpose

1. Java SE Security ----- *principle of least privilege*
2. JSSE ----- *private conversations*
3. Java EE Security ----- *deadbolt on front door*
4. Spring Security ----- *locks on room doors*
5. Web App Framework - *locks on equipment in rooms*
6. Database Functions ---- *content filtering*

Example #2

Apache Fortress Demo





<https://github.com/shawnmckinney/apache-fortress-demo>

Enable Java EE Security

the deadbolt



- Update web.xml
- Drop the proxy jar
- Add context.xml
- Add fortress to pom.xml



Setup Policy Decision Point

the security system

LDAPv3 server



Use ANSI RBAC INCITS 359 Specification

RBAC0:

- Users, Roles, Perms, Sessions

RBAC1:


- Hierarchical Roles

RBAC2:

- Static Separation of Duties


RBAC3:

- Dynamic Separation of Duties




The Standards Journey

- An RBAC authority reference:
 - <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/>
- An original paper on RBAC:
 - <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/documents/ferraiolo-kuhn-92.pdf>
- An updated paper on RBAC:
 - <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/documents/sandhu-ferraiolo-kuhn-00.pdf>
- The current standard
 - <http://profsandhu.com/journals/tissec/ANSI+INCITS+359-2004.pdf>



Use ANSI RBAC INCITS 359 Specification



Use RBAC Object Model

Six basic elements:

1. **User** – human or machine entity
2. **Role** – a job function within an organization
3. **Object** – maps to system resources
4. **Operation** – executable image of program
5. **Permission** – approval to perform an Operation on one or more Objects
6. **Session** – contains set of activated roles for User


Apache Fortress™

Access Management SDK and Web Components

A standards-based access management system, written in Java, supports ANSI INCITS 359 RBAC and more.

Web System Architecture

Option to use either HTTP or LDAPV3 protocol



Use RBAC Functional Model

APIs form three standard interfaces:

1. Admin – Add, Update, Delete
2. Review – Read, Search
3. System – Access Control

Use RBAC Functional Model


System Manager APIs:

<http://directory.apache.org/fortress/gen-docs/latest/apidocs/org/apache/directory/fortress/core/impl/AccessMgrImpl.html>

1. createSession – authenticate, activate roles
2. checkAccess – permission check
3. sessionPermissions – all perms active for user
4. sessionRoles – return all roles active
5. addActiveRole – add new role to session
6. dropActiveRole – remove role from session



Example #3 : Role Engineering Sample



<https://github.com/shawnmckinney/role-engineering-sample>

■ HTTP

■ LDAPv3

1. HTTP server
2. Java EE AuthN & AuthZ
3. RBAC Policy Decision Point
4. Spring AuthZ
5. Web App AuthZ





Enable Spring Security

a. Authorization

b. Role mapping


locks on the rooms




Web App Authorization

Add fine-grained checks:

- a. Page links
- b. Buttons
- c. Other controls



Locks on equipment



■ HTTP ■ LDAPv3
● Confidentiality ● Authorization



1. HTTPS server
2. HTTPS private key
3. Java EE AuthN & AuthZ
4. RBAC Policy Decision Point
5. LDAP SSL client
6. SSL public key
7. LDAP SSL server
8. SSL private key
9. Spring AuthZ
10. Web App AuthZ




DAO Authorization

Add fine-grained
Checks to:

- Create
- Read
- Update
- Delete



filtering



■ HTTP ■ JDBC ■ LDAPv3
● Confidentiality ● Authorization

1. HTTPS server
2. HTTPS private key
3. Java EE AuthN & AuthZ
4. RBAC Policy Decision Point
5. LDAP SSL client
6. SSL public key
7. LDAP SSL server
8. SSL private key
9. Spring AuthZ
10. Web App AuthZ
11. DAO AuthZ





Enable SSL Everywhere

Client


- a. public key
- b. config

Server

- a. private key
- b. config



Confidentiality



■ HTTP ■ JDBC ■ LDAPv3

● Confidentiality ● Authorization

1. HTTPS server
2. HTTPS private key
3. Java EE AuthN & AuthZ
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5. LDAP SSL client
6. SSL public key
7. LDAP SSL server
8. SSL private key
9. Spring AuthZ
10. Web App AuthZ
11. DAO AuthZ
12. JDBC SSL client
13. Database SSL server



Apache Fortress Demo


- Three Pages and Three Customers
- One role for every page to customer combo
- Users may be assigned to one or more roles
- One and only one role may be activated

Pages	Customer 123	Customer 456	Customer 789
Page One	PAGE1_123	PAGE1_456	PAGE1_789
Page Two	PAGE2_123	PAGE2_456	PAGE2_789
Page Three	PAGE3_123	PAGE3_456	PAGE3_789



User123	Customer 123	Customer 456	Customer 789
Page1	True	False	False
Page2	True	False	False
Page3	True	False	False
User1	Customer 123	Customer 456	Customer 789
Page1	True	True	True
Page2	False	False	False
Page3	False	False	False
User1_123	Customer 123	Customer 456	Customer 789
Page1	True	False	False
Page2	False	False	False
Page3	False	False	False

RBAC Demo



Testing

- Verify security functionality via automation.
- Beware of regressions. Can go unnoticed for weeks, months, years.

<https://github.com/shawnmckinney/apache-fortress-demo/.../ApacheFortressDemoSeleniumITCase.java>

We still have a problem...

▼ 👤 ou=Roles (17)

👤 cn=PAGE1_123

👤 cn=PAGE1_456

👤 cn=PAGE1_789

👤 cn=PAGE2_123

👤 cn=PAGE2_456


👤 cn=PAGE2_789

👤 cn=PAGE3_123

👤 cn=PAGE3_456

👤 cn=PAGE3_789

Roles Have Exploded



Number of Roles = sizeof(A) * sizeof(B)

Roles (A)

Relationships (B)

Page1

Customer 123

Page2

*

Customer 456

=>

Page3

Customer 789


Roles

1. Page1-123
2. Page1-456
3. Page1-789
4. Page2-123
5. Page2-456
6. Page2-789
7. Page3-123
8. Page3-456
9. Page3-789



RBAC only

Roles




The Solution

Use attributes to constrain under what conditions roles may be activated.


RBAC Policy Enhanced

Role Based Access Control – Policy-Enhanced, ANSI INCITS 494 prescribes the usage of dynamic constraints (runtime) which may be applied to users, roles, operations, objects, and permissions.

Use ANSI RBAC INCITS 359 Specification



Use ANSI RBAC & ABAC



RBAC w/ ABAC

Roles

Cashiers

Washers

Managers

❖ Curly ❖


Cashiers:
McDonald's, Inout,
BurgerKing

❖ Moe ❖

❖ Cashiers: InOut
❖ Washers : BurgerKing
❖ Managers: McDonald's


❖ Larry ❖

❖ Cashiers: BurgerKing
❖ Washers: InOut, McDonald's



RBAC w/ ABAC

Roles



Under the Hood



<https://appdevcloudworkshop.github.io/images/introduction/image16.png>



RBAC only

ou=Roles (17)

- cn=PAGE1_123
- cn=PAGE1_456
- cn=PAGE1_789
- cn=PAGE2_123
- cn=PAGE2_456
- cn=PAGE2_789
- cn=PAGE3_123
- cn=PAGE3_456
- cn=PAGE3_789

uid	user123
uidNumber	1237
description	Apache Fortress Demo User123 Access all Pages for Customer 123
displayName	test2
ftCstr	user123\$0\$0000\$0000\$20090101\$20990101\$none\$none\$1234567
ftProps	initAttrArrays:
ftRA	PAGE1_123
ftRA	PAGE2_123
ftRA	PAGE3_123
ftRC	PAGE1_123\$0\$0000\$0000\$none\$none\$none\$none\$all
ftRC	PAGE2_123\$0\$0000\$0000\$none\$none\$none\$none\$all
ftRC	PAGE3_123\$0\$0000\$0000\$none\$none\$none\$none\$all

RBAC w/ ABAC

ou=Roles (23)

- cn=ABAC_PAGE1
- cn=ABAC_PAGE2
- cn=ABAC_PAGE3

uid	user123
uidNumber	1254
description	Apache Fortress Demo User123 Access all Pages for Customer 123
displayName	test2
ftCstr	user123\$0\$\$\$\$\$\$\$
ftProps	initAttrArrays:
ftRA	ABAC_PAGE1
ftRA	ABAC_PAGE2
ftRA	ABAC_PAGE3
ftRC	ABAC_PAGE1\$0\$\$\$\$\$\$\$
ftRC	abac_page1\$type\$USER\$customer\$123\$
ftRC	ABAC_PAGE2\$0\$\$\$\$\$\$\$
ftRC	abac_page2\$type\$USER\$customer\$123\$
ftRC	ABAC_PAGE3\$0\$\$\$\$\$\$\$
ftRC	abac_page3\$type\$USER\$customer\$123\$



Role Constraints

```
<roleconstraint role="PAGE1"  
  key="customer" ... />
```

```
<roleconstraint role="PAGE2"  
  key="customer" ... />
```

```
<roleconstraint role="PAGE3"  
  key="customer" ... />
```

User-Role Constraints

```
<roleconstraint userId="User123" role="PAGE1"  
  key="customer" value="123" ... />
```

```
<roleconstraint userId="User123" role="PAGE2"  
  key="customer" value="123" ... />
```

```
<roleconstraint userId="User123" role="PAGE3"  
  key="customer" value="123" ... />
```

Code Sample

```
// Nothing new here:
User user = new User("curly");

// This is new:
RoleConstraint constraint = new RoleConstraint( );

// In practice we're not gonna pass hard-coded key-values in here:
constraint.setKey( "customer" );
constraint.setValue( "123" );


// This is just boilerplate goop:
List<RoleConstraint> constraints = new ArrayList();
constraints.add( constraint );

try
{
    // Create the RBAC session with ABAC constraint -- customer=123, asserted:
    Session session = accessMgr.createSession( user, constraints );
    ...
}
```

<https://github.com/shawnmckinney/fortress-abac-demo/blob/master/src/main/java/com/mycompany/MyBasePage.java>

Example #4

Apache
Fortress
ABAC
Demo



<https://github.com/shawnmckinney/fortress-abac-demo>

ABAC Demo



Closing Thoughts

1. Never allow users more than they need to do their jobs
 - *Principle of Least Privilege*
2. Apply security controls across many layers
 - *Defense in Depth*
3. RBAC may be combined with ABAC
 - *Fine-grained Authorization*

Examples

1. <https://github.com/shawnmckinney/remote-code-execution-sample>
2. <https://github.com/shawnmckinney/apache-fortress-demo>
3. <https://github.com/shawnmckinney/role-engineering-sample>
4. <https://github.com/shawnmckinney/fortress-abac-demo>

BONUS:

5. <https://github.com/shawnmckinney/rbac-abac-sample>
6. <https://github.com/shawnmckinney/fortress-saml-demo>



Questions

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